

# Nonstandard Frameworks of Imprecision and Uncertainty

## Content:

Random Sets

Imprecise Probabilities

Possibility Theory

Belief Functions

# Problems with Probability Theory

Representation of Ignorance (dt. Unwissen)

We are given a die with faces  $1, \dots, 6$

What is the certainty of showing up face  $i$  ?

- Conduct a statistical survey (roll the die 10000 times) and estimate the relative frequency:  $P(\{i\}) = \frac{1}{6}$
- Use subjective probabilities (which is often the normal case): We do not know anything (especially and explicitly we do not have any reason to assign unequal probabilities), so the most plausible distribution is a uniform one.

Problem: Uniform distribution because of ignorance or extensive statistical tests

Experts analyze aircraft shapes: 3 aircraft types  $A, B, C$

“It is type  $A$  or  $B$  with 90% certainty. About  $C$ , I don't have any clue and I do not want to commit myself. No preferences for  $A$  or  $B$ .”

Problem: Propositions hard to handle with Bayesian theory

# Random Sets: Modeling Imprecise Data

“ $A \subseteq X$  being an imprecise date” means: the true value  $x_0$  lies in  $A$  but there are no preferences on  $A$ .

$\Omega$  set of possible elementary events

$\Theta = \{\xi\}$  set of observers

$\lambda(\xi)$  importance of observer  $\xi$

Some elementary event from  $\Omega$  occurs and every observer  $\xi \in \Theta$  shall announce which elementary events she personally considers possible. This set is denoted by  $\Gamma(\xi) \subseteq \Omega$ .  $\Gamma(\xi)$  is then an imprecise date.

$\lambda : 2^\Theta \rightarrow [0, 1]$  probability measure  
(interpreted as importance measure)

$(\Theta, 2^\Theta, \lambda)$  probability space

$\Gamma : \Theta \rightarrow 2^\Omega$  set-valued mapping

## Imprecise Data (2)

Let  $A \subseteq \Omega$ :

$$\text{a) } \Gamma^*(A) \stackrel{\text{Def}}{=} \{\xi \in \Theta \mid \Gamma(\xi) \cap A \neq \emptyset\}$$

$$\text{b) } \Gamma_*(A) \stackrel{\text{Def}}{=} \{\xi \in \Theta \mid \Gamma(\xi) \neq \emptyset \text{ and } \Gamma(\xi) \subseteq A\}$$

Remarks:

a) If  $\xi \in \Gamma^*(A)$ , then it is *plausible* for  $\xi$  that the occurred elementary event lies in  $A$ .

b) If  $\xi \in \Gamma_*(A)$ , then it is *certain* for  $\xi$  that the event lies in  $A$ .

$$\text{c) } \{\xi \mid \Gamma(\xi) \neq \emptyset\} = \Gamma^*(\Omega) = \Gamma_*(\Omega)$$

Let  $\lambda(\Gamma^*(\Omega)) > 0$ . Then we call

$$P^*(A) = \frac{\lambda(\Gamma^*(A))}{\lambda(\Gamma^*(\Omega))} \quad \text{the upper, and} \quad P_*(A) = \frac{\lambda(\Gamma_*(A))}{\lambda(\Gamma_*(\Omega))} \quad \text{the lower}$$

probability w. r. t.  $\lambda$  and  $\Gamma$ .

# Example

$$\begin{array}{lll}
 \Theta = \{a, b, c, d\} & \lambda: a \mapsto 1/6 & \Gamma: a \mapsto \{1\} \\
 \Omega = \{1, 2, 3\} & b \mapsto 1/6 & b \mapsto \{2\} \\
 \Gamma^*(\Omega) = \{a, b, d\} & c \mapsto 2/6 & c \mapsto \emptyset \\
 \lambda(\Gamma^*(\Omega)) = 4/6 & d \mapsto 2/6 & d \mapsto \{2, 3\}
 \end{array}$$

$A$	$\Gamma^*(A)$	$\Gamma_*(A)$	$P^*(A)$	$P_*(A)$
$\emptyset$	$\emptyset$	$\emptyset$	0	0
$\{1\}$	$\{a\}$	$\{a\}$	$\frac{1}{4}$	$\frac{1}{4}$
$\{2\}$	$\{b, d\}$	$\{b\}$	$\frac{3}{4}$	$\frac{1}{4}$
$\{3\}$	$\{d\}$	$\emptyset$	$\frac{1}{2}$	0
$\{1, 2\}$	$\{a, b, d\}$	$\{a, b\}$	1	$\frac{1}{2}$
$\{1, 3\}$	$\{a, d\}$	$\{a\}$	$\frac{3}{4}$	$\frac{1}{4}$
$\{2, 3\}$	$\{b, d\}$	$\{b, d\}$	$\frac{3}{4}$	$\frac{3}{4}$
$\{1, 2, 3\}$	$\{a, b, d\}$	$\{a, b, d\}$	1	1

One can consider  $P^*(A)$  and  $P_*(A)$  as upper and lower probability bounds.

# Imprecise Data (3)

Some properties of probability bounds:

a)  $P^*: 2^\Omega \rightarrow [0, 1]$

b)  $0 \leq P_* \leq P^* \leq 1, \quad P_*(\emptyset) = P^*(\emptyset) = 0, \quad P_*(\Omega) = P^*(\Omega) = 1$

c)  $A \subseteq B \Rightarrow P^*(A) \leq P^*(B) \quad \text{and} \quad P_*(A) \leq P_*(B)$

d)  $A \cap B = \emptyset \not\Rightarrow P^*(A) + P^*(B) = P^*(A \cup B)$

e)  $P_*(A \cup B) \geq P_*(A) + P_*(B) - P_*(A \cap B)$

f)  $P^*(A \cup B) \leq P^*(A) + P^*(B) - P^*(A \cap B)$

g)  $P_*(A) = 1 - P^*(\Omega \setminus A)$

## Imprecise Data (4)

One can prove the following generalized equation:

$$P_*\left(\bigcup_{i=1}^n A_i\right) \geq \sum_{\emptyset \neq I: I \subseteq \{1, \dots, n\}} (-1)^{|I|+1} \cdot P_*\left(\bigcap_{i \in I} A_i\right)$$

These set functions also play an important role in theoretical physics (capacities, Choquet, 1955). Shafer did generalize these thoughts and developed a theory of belief functions.

# Belief Revision

How is new knowledge incorporated?

Every observer announces the location of the ship in form of a subset of all possible ship locations. Given these set-valued mappings, we can derive upper and lower probabilities with the help of the observer importance measure. Let us assume the ship is certainly at sea.

How do the upper/lower probabilities change?




# Example

## a) Geometric Conditioning

(observers that give partial or full wrong information are discarded)

$$P_*(A | B) = \frac{\lambda(\{\xi \in \Theta \mid \Gamma(\xi) \subseteq A \text{ and } \Gamma(\xi) \subseteq B\})}{\lambda(\{\xi \in \Theta \mid \Gamma(\xi) \subseteq B\})} = \frac{P_*(A \cap B)}{P_*(B)}$$

$$P^*(A | B) = \frac{\lambda(\{\xi \in \Theta \mid \Gamma(\xi) \subseteq B \text{ and } \Gamma(\xi) \cap A \neq \emptyset\})}{\lambda(\{\xi \in \Theta \mid \Gamma(\xi) \subseteq B\})} = \frac{P^*(A \cup \overline{B}) - P^*(\overline{B})}{1 - P^*(\overline{B})}$$




## Belief Revision (2)

### b) *Data Revision*

(the observed data is modified such that they fit the certain information)

$$(P_*)_B(A) = \frac{P_*(A \cup \bar{B}) - P_*(\bar{B})}{1 - P_*(B)}$$

$$(P^*)_B(A) = \frac{P^*(A \cap B)}{P^*(B)}$$



These two concepts have different semantics. There are several more belief revision concepts.

# Combination of Random Sets

Let  $(\Omega, 2^\Omega)$  be a space of events. Further be  $(O_1, 2^{O_1}, \lambda_1)$  and  $(O_2, 2^{O_2}, \lambda_2)$  spaces of independent observers.

We call  $(O_1 \times O_2, \lambda_1 \cdot \lambda_2)$  the product space of observers and

$$\Gamma : O_1 \times O_2 \rightarrow 2^\Omega, \Gamma(x_1, x_2) = \Gamma_1(x_1) \cap \Gamma_2(x_2)$$

the combined observer function.

We obtain with

$$(P_L)_*(A) = \frac{(\lambda_1 \cdot \lambda_2)(\{(x_1, x_2) \mid \Gamma(x_1, x_2) \neq \emptyset \wedge \Gamma(x_1, x_2) \subseteq A\})}{(\lambda_1 \cdot \lambda_2)(\{(x_1, x_2) \mid \Gamma(x_1, x_2) \neq \emptyset\})}$$

the lower probability of  $A$  that respects both observations.

# Example

$$\Omega = \{1, 2, 3\}$$

$$\lambda_1: \begin{aligned} \{a\} &\mapsto 1/3 \\ \{b\} &\mapsto 2/3 \end{aligned}$$

$$\lambda_2: \begin{aligned} \{c\} &\mapsto 1/2 \\ \{d\} &\mapsto 1/2 \end{aligned}$$

$$O_1 = \{a, b\}$$

$$\Gamma_1: \begin{aligned} a &\mapsto \{1, 2\} \\ b &\mapsto \{2, 3\} \end{aligned}$$

$$\Gamma_2: \begin{aligned} c &\mapsto \{1\} \\ d &\mapsto \{2, 3\} \end{aligned}$$

$$O_2 = \{c, d\}$$

$$b \mapsto \{2, 3\}$$

$$d \mapsto \{2, 3\}$$

Combination:

$$O_1 \times O_2 = \{\overline{ac}, \overline{bc}, \overline{ad}, \overline{bd}\}$$

$$\lambda: \{\overline{ac}\} \mapsto 1/6$$

$$\Gamma: \overline{ac} \mapsto \{1\}$$

$$\Gamma_*(\Omega) = \{(x_1, x_2) \mid \Gamma(x_1, x_2) \neq \emptyset\}$$

$$\{\overline{ad}\} \mapsto 1/6$$

$$\overline{ad} \mapsto \{2\}$$

$$= \{\overline{ac}, \overline{ad}, \overline{bd}\}$$

$$\{\overline{bc}\} \mapsto 2/6$$

$$\overline{bc} \mapsto \emptyset$$

$$\{\overline{bd}\} \mapsto 2/6$$

$$\overline{bd} \mapsto \{2, 3\}$$

$$\lambda(\Gamma_*(\Omega)) = 4/6$$

## Example (2)

$A$	$(P_*)_{\Gamma_1}(A)$	$(P_*)_{\Gamma_2}(A)$	$(P_*)_{\Gamma}(A)$
$\emptyset$	0	0	0
$\{1\}$	0	$1/2$	$1/4$
$\{2\}$	0	0	$1/4$
$\{3\}$	0	0	0
$\{1, 2\}$	$1/3$	$1/2$	$1/2$
$\{1, 3\}$	0	$1/2$	$1/4$
$\{2, 3\}$	$2/3$	$1/2$	$3/4$
$\{1, 2, 3\}$	1	1	1

# Imprecise Probabilities

Let  $x_0$  be the true value but assume there is no information about  $P(A)$  to decide whether  $x_0 \in A$ . There are only probability boundaries.

Let  $\mathcal{L}$  be a set of probability measures. Then we call

$$(P_{\mathcal{L}})_* : 2^{\Omega} \rightarrow [0, 1], A \mapsto \inf\{P(A) \mid P \in \mathcal{L}\} \quad \text{the lower and}$$

$$(P_{\mathcal{L}})^* : 2^{\Omega} \rightarrow [0, 1], A \mapsto \sup\{P(A) \mid P \in \mathcal{L}\} \quad \text{the upper}$$

probability of  $A$  w. r. t.  $\mathcal{L}$ .

a)  $(P_{\mathcal{L}})_*(\emptyset) = (P_{\mathcal{L}})^*(\emptyset) = 0; \quad (P_{\mathcal{L}})_*(\Omega) = (P_{\mathcal{L}})^*(\Omega) = 1$

b)  $0 \leq (P_{\mathcal{L}})_*(A) \leq (P_{\mathcal{L}})^*(A) \leq 1$

c)  $(P_{\mathcal{L}})^*(A) = 1 - (P_{\mathcal{L}})_*(\bar{A})$

d)  $(P_{\mathcal{L}})_*(A) + (P_{\mathcal{L}})_*(B) \leq (P_{\mathcal{L}})_*(A \cup B)$

e)  $(P_{\mathcal{L}})_*(A \cap B) + (P_{\mathcal{L}})_*(A \cup B) \not\geq (P_{\mathcal{L}})_*(A) + (P_{\mathcal{L}})_*(B)$

# Belief Revision

Let  $B \subseteq \Omega$  and  $\mathcal{L}$  a class of probabilities. Then we call

$A \subseteq \Omega : (P_{\mathcal{L}})_*(A | B) = \inf\{P(A | B) \mid P \in \mathcal{L} \wedge P(B) > 0\}$  the lower and

$A \subseteq \Omega : (P_{\mathcal{L}})^*(A | B) = \sup\{P(A | B) \mid P \in \mathcal{L} \wedge P(B) > 0\}$  the upper

conditional probability of  $A$  given  $B$ .

A class  $\mathcal{L}$  of probability measures on  $\Omega = \{\omega_1, \dots, \omega_n\}$  is of type 1, iff there exist functions  $R_1$  and  $R_2$  from  $2^\Omega$  into  $[0, 1]$  with:

$$\mathcal{L} = \{P \mid \forall A \subseteq \Omega : R_1(A) \leq P(A) \leq R_2(A)\}$$

## Belief Revision (2)

Intuition:  $P$  is determined by  $P(\{\omega_i\})$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, n$  which corresponds to a point in  $\mathbb{R}^n$  with coordinates  $(P(\{\omega_1\}), \dots, P(\{\omega_n\}))$ .

If  $\mathcal{L}$  is type 1, it holds true that:


$$\mathcal{L} \Leftrightarrow \left\{ (r_1, \dots, r_n) \in \mathbb{R}^n \mid \exists P: \forall A \subseteq \Omega: \right. \\ \left. (P_{\mathcal{L}})_*(A) \leq P(A) \leq (P_{\mathcal{L}})^*(A) \right. \\ \left. \text{and } r_i = P(\{\omega_i\}), i = 1, \dots, n \right\}$$



# Example

$$\Omega = \{\omega_1, \omega_2, \omega_3\}$$


$$\mathcal{L} = \{P \mid \frac{1}{2} \leq P(\{\omega_1, \omega_2\}) \leq 1, \quad \frac{1}{2} \leq P(\{\omega_2, \omega_3\}) \leq 1, \quad \frac{1}{2} \leq P(\{\omega_1, \omega_3\}) \leq 1\}$$




general restriction:

$$0 \leq P(\{\omega_i\}) \leq 1$$

$$P(\{\omega_1\}) + P(\{\omega_2\}) + P(\{\omega_3\}) = 1$$



$$\{P \mid \frac{1}{2} \leq P(\{\omega_1, \omega_2\}) \leq 1\}$$



Let  $A_1 = \{\omega_1, \omega_2\}$ ,  $A_2 = \{\omega_2, \omega_3\}$ ,  $A_3 = \{\omega_1, \omega_3\}$

$$\begin{aligned} P_*(A_1) + P_*(A_2) + P_*(A_3) - P_*(A_1 \cap A_2) - P_*(A_2 \cap A_3) - P_*(A_1 \cap A_3) + P_*(A_1 \cap A_2 \cap A_3) \\ = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} - 0 - 0 - 0 + 0 = \frac{3}{2} > 1 = P(A_1 \cup A_2 \cup A_3) \end{aligned}$$

## Belief Revision (3)

If  $\mathcal{L}$  is type 1 and  $(P_{\mathcal{L}})^*(A \cup B) \geq (P_{\mathcal{L}})^*(A) + (P_{\mathcal{L}})^*(B) - (P_{\mathcal{L}})^*(A \cap B)$ , then

$$(P_{\mathcal{L}})^*(A | B) = \frac{(P_{\mathcal{L}})^*(A \cap B)}{(P_{\mathcal{L}})^*(A \cap B) + (P_{\mathcal{L}})_*(B \cap \bar{A})}$$

and

$$(P_{\mathcal{L}})_*(A | B) = \frac{(P_{\mathcal{L}})_*(A \cap B)}{(P_{\mathcal{L}})_*(A \cap B) + (P_{\mathcal{L}})^*(B \cap \bar{A})}$$

Let  $\mathcal{L}$  be a class of type 1.  $\mathcal{L}$  is of type 2, iff

$$(P_{\mathcal{L}})_*(A_1 \cup \dots \cup A_n) \geq \sum_{I: \emptyset \neq I \subseteq \{1, \dots, n\}} (-1)^{|I|+1} \cdot (P_{\mathcal{L}})_*\left(\bigcap_{i \in I} A_i\right)$$

# Possibility Theory

The best-known calculus for handling uncertainty is, of course, **probability theory**. [Laplace 1812]

An less well-known, but noteworthy alternative is **possibility theory**. [Dubois and Prade 1988]

In the interpretation we consider here, possibility theory can handle **uncertain and imprecise information**, while probability theory, at least in its basic form, was only designed to handle *uncertain information*.

Types of **imperfect information**:

- **Imprecision:** disjunctive or set-valued information about the obtaining state, which is certain: the true state is contained in the disjunction or set.
- **Uncertainty:** precise information about the obtaining state (single case), which is not certain: the true state may differ from the stated one.
- **Vagueness:** meaning of the information is in doubt: the interpretation of the given statements about the obtaining state may depend on the user.

# Possibility Theory: Axiomatic Approach

**Definition:** Let  $\Omega$  be a (finite) sample space.

A **possibility measure**  $\Pi$  on  $\Omega$  is a function  $\Pi : 2^\Omega \rightarrow [0, 1]$  satisfying

1.  $\Pi(\emptyset) = 0$       and
2.  $\forall E_1, E_2 \subseteq \Omega : \Pi(E_1 \cup E_2) = \max\{\Pi(E_1), \Pi(E_2)\}$ .

Similar to Kolmogorov's axioms of probability theory.

From the axioms follows  $\Pi(E_1 \cap E_2) \leq \min\{\Pi(E_1), \Pi(E_2)\}$ .

Attributes are introduced as random variables (as in probability theory).

$\Pi(A = a)$  is an abbreviation of  $\Pi(\{\omega \in \Omega \mid A(\omega) = a\})$

If an event  $E$  is possible without restriction, then  $\Pi(E) = 1$ .

If an event  $E$  is impossible, then  $\Pi(E) = 0$ .

## Interpretation of Degrees of Possibility

[Gebhardt and Kruse 1993]

Let  $\Omega$  be the (nonempty) set of all possible states of the world,  
 $\omega_0$  the actual (but unknown) state.


Let  $C = \{c_1, \dots, c_n\}$  be a set of contexts (observers, frame conditions etc.)  
and  $(C, 2^C, P)$  a finite probability space (context weights).

Let  $\Gamma : C \rightarrow 2^\Omega$  be a set-valued mapping, which assigns to each context  
the **most specific correct set-valued specification of  $\omega_0$** .  
The sets  $\Gamma(c)$  are called the **focal sets** of  $\Gamma$ .

$\Gamma$  is a **random set** (i.e., a set-valued random variable) [Nguyen 1978].  
The **basic possibility assignment** induced by  $\Gamma$  is the mapping

$$\begin{aligned}\pi : \Omega &\rightarrow [0, 1] \\ \pi(\omega) &\mapsto P(\{c \in C \mid \omega \in \Gamma(c)\}).\end{aligned}$$

# Example: Dice and Shakers



numbers	degree of possibility
1 - 4	$\frac{1}{5} + \frac{1}{5} + \frac{1}{5} + \frac{1}{5} + \frac{1}{5} = 1$
5 - 6	$\frac{1}{5} + \frac{1}{5} + \frac{1}{5} + \frac{1}{5} = \frac{4}{5}$
7 - 8	$\frac{1}{5} + \frac{1}{5} + \frac{1}{5} = \frac{3}{5}$
9 - 10	$\frac{1}{5} + \frac{1}{5} = \frac{2}{5}$
11 - 12	$\frac{1}{5} = \frac{1}{5}$

# From the Context Model to Possibility Measures

**Definition:** Let  $\Gamma : C \rightarrow 2^\Omega$  be a random set.

The **possibility measure** induced by  $\Gamma$  is the mapping

$$\begin{aligned} \Pi : 2^\Omega &\rightarrow [0, 1], \\ E &\mapsto P(\{c \in C \mid E \cap \Gamma(c) \neq \emptyset\}). \end{aligned}$$

**Problem:** From the given interpretation it follows only:

$$\forall E \subseteq \Omega : \max_{\omega \in E} \pi(\omega) \leq \Pi(E) \leq \min \left\{ 1, \sum_{\omega \in E} \pi(\omega) \right\}.$$

	1	2	3	4	5
$c_1 : \frac{1}{2}$			•		
$c_2 : \frac{1}{4}$		•	•	•	
$c_3 : \frac{1}{4}$	•	•	•	•	•
$\pi$	0	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{4}$

	1	2	3	4	5
$c_1 : \frac{1}{2}$			•		
$c_2 : \frac{1}{4}$	•	•			
$c_3 : \frac{1}{4}$				•	•
$\pi$	$\frac{1}{4}$	$\frac{1}{4}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{4}$	$\frac{1}{4}$

# From the Context Model to Possibility Measures (cont.)

Attempts to solve the indicated problem:

Require the focal sets to be **consonant**:

**Definition:** Let  $\Gamma : C \rightarrow 2^\Omega$  be a random set with  $C = \{c_1, \dots, c_n\}$ . The focal sets  $\Gamma(c_i)$ ,  $1 \leq i \leq n$ , are called **consonant**, iff there exists a sequence  $c_{i_1}, c_{i_2}, \dots, c_{i_n}$ ,  $1 \leq i_1, \dots, i_n \leq n$ ,  $\forall 1 \leq j < k \leq n : i_j \neq i_k$ , so that

$$\Gamma(c_{i_1}) \subseteq \Gamma(c_{i_2}) \subseteq \dots \subseteq \Gamma(c_{i_n}).$$

→ mass assignment theory [Baldwin *et al.* 1995]

**Problem:** The “voting model” is not sufficient to justify consonance.

Use the lower bound as the “most pessimistic” choice. [Gebhardt 1997]

**Problem:** Basic possibility assignments represent negative information, the lower bound is actually the *most optimistic* choice.

Justify the lower bound from decision making purposes.



# From the Context Model to Possibility Measures (cont.)

Assume that in the end we have to decide on a single event.

Each event is described by the values of a set of attributes.

Then it can be useful to assign to a set of events the degree of possibility of the “most possible” event in the set.

Example:

$\Sigma$	36	18	18	28	
28	0	0	0	28	28
18	18	0	0	0	18
18	18	0	0	0	18
36	0	18	18	0	18
	18	18	18	28	max

0	40	0	40
40	0	0	40
0	0	20	20
40	40	20	max

# Possibility Distributions


**Definition:** Let  $X = \{A_1, \dots, A_n\}$  be a set of attributes defined on a (finite) sample space  $\Omega$  with respective domains  $\text{dom}(A_i)$ ,  $i = 1, \dots, n$ . A **possibility distribution**  $\pi_X$  over  $X$  is the restriction of a possibility measure  $\Pi$  on  $\Omega$  to the set of all events that can be defined by stating values for all attributes in  $X$ . That is,  $\pi_X = \Pi|_{\mathcal{E}_X}$ , where

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{E}_X &= \left\{ E \in 2^\Omega \mid \begin{array}{l} \exists a_1 \in \text{dom}(A_1) : \dots \exists a_n \in \text{dom}(A_n) : \\ E \cong \bigwedge_{A_j \in X} A_j = a_j \end{array} \right\} \\ &= \left\{ E \in 2^\Omega \mid \begin{array}{l} \exists a_1 \in \text{dom}(A_1) : \dots \exists a_n \in \text{dom}(A_n) : \\ E = \left\{ \omega \in \Omega \mid \bigwedge_{A_j \in X} A_j(\omega) = a_j \right\} \end{array} \right\}. \end{aligned}$$

Corresponds to the notion of a probability distribution.


Advantage of this formalization: No index transformation functions are needed for projections, there are just fewer terms in the conjunctions.

# A Possibility Distribution



The numbers state the degrees of possibility of the corresp. value combination.

# Reasoning



Using the information that the given object is green.

# Possibilistic Decomposition

As for relational and probabilistic networks, the three-dimensional possibility distribution can be decomposed into projections to subspaces, namely:

- the maximum projection to the subspace color  $\times$  shape and
- the maximum projection to the subspace shape  $\times$  size.


It can be reconstructed using the following formula:

$$\begin{aligned}\forall i, j, k : \pi \left( a_i^{(\text{color})}, a_j^{(\text{shape})}, a_k^{(\text{size})} \right) \\ &= \min \left\{ \pi \left( a_i^{(\text{color})}, a_j^{(\text{shape})} \right), \pi \left( a_j^{(\text{shape})}, a_k^{(\text{size})} \right) \right\} \\ &= \min \left\{ \max_k \pi \left( a_i^{(\text{color})}, a_j^{(\text{shape})}, a_k^{(\text{size})} \right), \right. \\ &\quad \left. \max_i \pi \left( a_i^{(\text{color})}, a_j^{(\text{shape})}, a_k^{(\text{size})} \right) \right\}\end{aligned}$$


Note the analogy to the probabilistic reconstruction formulas.

# Reasoning with Projections

Again the same result can be obtained using only projections to subspaces (maximal degrees of possibility):



This justifies a graph representation:



# Conditional Possibility and Independence

**Definition:** Let  $\Omega$  be a (finite) sample space,  $\Pi$  a possibility measure on  $\Omega$ , and  $E_1, E_2 \subseteq \Omega$  events. Then

$$\Pi(E_1 \mid E_2) = \Pi(E_1 \cap E_2)$$

is called the **conditional possibility** of  $E_1$  given  $E_2$ .

**Definition:** Let  $\Omega$  be a (finite) sample space,  $\Pi$  a possibility measure on  $\Omega$ , and  $A, B$ , and  $C$  attributes with respective domains  $\text{dom}(A)$ ,  $\text{dom}(B)$ , and  $\text{dom}(C)$ .  $A$  and  $B$  are called **conditionally possibilistically independent** given  $C$ , written  $A \perp_{\Pi} B \mid C$ , iff

$$\forall a \in \text{dom}(A) : \forall b \in \text{dom}(B) : \forall c \in \text{dom}(C) : \\ \Pi(A = a, B = b \mid C = c) = \min\{\Pi(A = a \mid C = c), \Pi(B = b \mid C = c)\}.$$

Similar to the corresponding notions of probability theory.

# Possibilistic Evidence Propagation

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \pi(B = b \mid A = a_{\text{obs}}) \\
 &= \pi\left(\bigvee_{a \in \text{dom}(A)} A = a, B = b, \bigvee_{c \in \text{dom}(C)} C = c \mid A = a_{\text{obs}}\right) \\
 &\stackrel{(1)}{=} \max_{a \in \text{dom}(A)} \left\{ \max_{c \in \text{dom}(C)} \left\{ \pi(A = a, B = b, C = c \mid A = a_{\text{obs}}) \right\} \right\} \\
 &\stackrel{(2)}{=} \max_{a \in \text{dom}(A)} \left\{ \max_{c \in \text{dom}(C)} \left\{ \min\left\{ \pi(A = a, B = b, C = c), \pi(A = a \mid A = a_{\text{obs}}) \right\} \right\} \right\} \\
 &\stackrel{(3)}{=} \max_{a \in \text{dom}(A)} \left\{ \max_{c \in \text{dom}(C)} \left\{ \min\left\{ \pi(A = a, B = b), \pi(B = b, C = c), \right. \right. \right. \\
 &\quad \left. \left. \left. \pi(A = a \mid A = a_{\text{obs}}) \right\} \right\} \right\} \\
 &= \max_{a \in \text{dom}(A)} \left\{ \min\left\{ \pi(A = a, B = b), \pi(A = a \mid A = a_{\text{obs}}), \right. \right. \\
 &\quad \left. \left. \underbrace{\max_{c \in \text{dom}(C)} \left\{ \pi(B = b, C = c) \right\}}_{=\pi(B=b) \geq \pi(A=a, B=b)} \right\} \right\} \\
 &= \max_{a \in \text{dom}(A)} \left\{ \min\left\{ \pi(A = a, B = b), \pi(A = a \mid A = a_{\text{obs}}) \right\} \right\}
 \end{aligned}$$

$A$ :	color
$B$ :	shape
$C$ :	size



# Belief Functions

## Motivation

$(\Theta, Q)$       Sensors

$\Omega$             possible results,  $\Gamma : \Theta \rightarrow 2^\Omega$

$\Gamma, Q$         induce a probability  $m$  on  $2^\Omega$

$m :$              $A \mapsto Q(\{\theta \in \Theta \mid \Gamma(\theta) = A\})$

mass distribution

Bel :             $A \mapsto \sum_{B:B \subseteq A} m(B)$

Belief (lower probability)

Pl :             $A \mapsto \sum_{B:B \cap A \neq \emptyset} m(B)$

Plausibility (upper probability)

Random sets: Dempster (1968)

Belief functions: Shafer (1974)

Development of a completely new uncertainty calculus as an alternative to Probability Theory

## Belief Functions (2)

The function  $\text{Bel} : 2^\Omega \rightarrow [0, 1]$  is called *belief function*, if it possesses the following properties:

$$\text{Bel}(\emptyset) = 0$$

$$\text{Bel}(\Omega) = 1$$

$$\forall n \in \mathbb{N}: \forall A_1, \dots, A_n \in 2^\Omega :$$

$$\text{Bel}(A_1 \cup \dots \cup A_n) \geq \sum_{\emptyset \neq I \subseteq \{1, \dots, n\}} (-1)^{|I|+1} \cdot \text{Bel}(\bigcap_{i \in I} A_i)$$

If  $\text{Bel}$  is a belief function then for  $m : 2^\Omega \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$  with  $m(A) = \sum_{B: B \subseteq A} (-1)^{|A \setminus B|} \cdot \text{Bel}(B)$  the following properties hold:

$$0 \leq m(A) \leq 1$$

$$m(\emptyset) = 0$$

$$\sum_{A \subseteq \Omega} m(A) = 1$$

## Belief Functions (3)

Let  $|\Omega| < \infty$  and  $f, g : 2^\Omega \rightarrow [0, 1]$ .

$$\forall A \subseteq \Omega: (f(A) = \sum_{B: B \subseteq A} g(B))$$

$\Leftrightarrow$

$$\forall A \subseteq \Omega: (g(A) = \sum_{B: B \subseteq A} (-1)^{|A \setminus B|} \cdot f(B))$$

( $g$  is called the *Möbius transformed* of  $f$ )

The mapping  $m : 2^\Omega \rightarrow [0, 1]$  is called a *mass distribution*, if the following properties hold:

$$m(\emptyset) = 0$$

$$\sum_{A \subseteq \Omega} m(A) = 1$$

# Example

$A$	$\emptyset$	$\{1\}$	$\{2\}$	$\{3\}$	$\{1, 2\}$	$\{2, 3\}$	$\{1, 3\}$	$\{1, 2, 3\}$
$m(A)$	0	$1/4$	$1/4$	0	0	0	$2/4$	0
$\text{Bel}(A)$	0	$1/4$	$1/4$	0	$2/4$	$1/4$	$3/4$	1

Belief  $\hat{=}$  lower probability with modified semantic

$$\text{Bel}(\{1, 3\}) = m(\emptyset) + m(\{1\}) + m(\{3\}) + m(\{1, 3\})$$

$$m(\{1, 3\}) = \text{Bel}(\{1, 3\}) - \text{Bel}(\{1\}) - \text{Bel}(\{3\})$$

$m(A)$  measure of the trust/belief that exactly  $A$  occurs

$\text{Bel}_m(A)$  measure of total belief that  $A$  occurs

$\text{Pl}_m(A)$  measure of not being able to disprove  $A$  (plausibility)

$$\text{Pl}_m(A) = \sum_{B: A \cap B \neq \emptyset} m(B) = 1 - \text{Bel}(\bar{A})$$

Given one of  $m$ ,  $\text{Bel}$  or  $\text{Pl}$ , the other two can be efficiently computed.

# Knowledge Representation

$$m(\Omega) = 1, m(A) = 0 \text{ else}$$

total ignorance

$$m(\{\omega_0\}) = 1, m(A) = 0 \text{ else}$$

value ( $\omega_0$ ) known

$$m(\{\omega_i\}) = p_i, \sum_{i=1}^n p_i = 1$$

Bayesian analysis

Further intermediate steps can be modeled.

# Belief Revision

Data Revision:

- Mass of  $A$  flows onto  $A \cap B$ .
- Masses are normalized to 1 ( $\emptyset$ -mass is destroyed)

Geometric Conditioning:

- Masses that do not lie completely inside  $B$ , flow off
- Normalize

The mass flow can be described by specialization matrices

# Combinations of Mass Distributions

Motivation: Combination of  $m_1$  and  $m_2$

$m_1(A_i) \cdot m_2(B_j) :$  Mass attached to  $A_i \cap B_j$ ,  
if only  $A_i$  or  $B_j$  are concerned

$\sum_{i,j:A_i \cap B_j = A} m_1(A_i) \cdot m_2(B_j) :$  Mass attached to  $A$  (after combination)

This consideration only leads to a mass distribution,  
if  $\sum_{i,j:A_i \cap B_j = \emptyset} m_1(A_i) \cdot m_2(B_j) = 0$ .

If this sum is  $> 0$  normalization takes place.

# Combination Rule

If  $m_1$  and  $m_2$  are mass distributions over  $\Omega$  with belief functions  $\text{Bel}_1$  and  $\text{Bel}_2$  and does further hold  $\sum_{i,j:A_i \cap B_j = \emptyset} m_1(A_i) \cdot m_2(B_j) < 1$ , then the function  $m : 2^\Omega \rightarrow [0, 1]$ ,  $m(\emptyset) = 0$

$$m(A) = \frac{\sum_{B,C:B \cap C = A} m_1(B) \cdot m_2(C)}{1 - \sum_{B,C:B \cap C = \emptyset} m_1(B) \cdot m_2(C)}$$

is a mass distribution. The belief function of  $m$  is denoted as  $\text{comb}(\text{Bel}_1, \text{Bel}_2)$  or  $\text{Bel}_1 \oplus \text{Bel}_2$ . The above formula is called the combination rule.



# Example

$$m_1(\{1, 2\}) = 1/3$$

$$m_1(\{2, 3\}) = 2/3$$

$$m_2(\{1\}) = 1/2$$

$$m_2(\{2, 3\}) = 1/2$$

$$m = m_1 \oplus m_2 :$$

$$\{1\} \mapsto \frac{1/6}{4/6} = 1/4$$

$$\{2\} \mapsto \frac{1/6}{4/6} = 1/4$$

$$\emptyset \mapsto 0$$

$$\{2, 3\} \mapsto \frac{2/6}{4/6} = 1/2$$

## Combination Rule (2)

Remarks:

- a) The result from the combination rule and the analysis of random sets is identical
- b) There are more efficient ways of combination
- c)  $\text{Bel}_1 \oplus \text{Bel}_2 = \text{Bel}_2 \oplus \text{Bel}_1$
- d)  $\oplus$  is associative
- e)  $\text{Bel}_1 \oplus \text{Bel}_1 \neq \text{Bel}_1$  (in general)
- f)  $\text{Bel}_2 : 2^\Omega \rightarrow [0, 1], m_2(B) = 1$

$$\text{Bel}_2(A) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } B \subseteq A \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

The combination of  $\text{Bel}_1$  and  $\text{Bel}_2$  yields the data revision of  $m_1$  with  $B$ .

# Decision Making with the Pignistic Transformation

The **pignistic transformation**  $Bet$  transforms a normalized mass function  $m$  into a probability measure  $P_m = Bet(m)$  as follows:

$$P_m(A) = \sum_{\emptyset \neq B \subseteq \Omega} m(B) \frac{|A \cap B|}{|B|}, \forall A \subseteq \Omega.$$

It can be shown that

$$bel(A) \leq P_m(A) \leq pl(A)$$

# Decision Making - Example

There are three possible murders

Let  $m(\{John\}) = 0.48$ ,  $m(\{John, Mary\}) = 0.12$ ,  
 $m(\{Peter, John\}) = 0.32$ ,  $m(\Omega) = 0.08$

We have:

$$P_m(\{John\}) = 0.48 + \frac{0.12}{2} + \frac{0.32}{2} + \frac{0.08}{3} \approx 0.73$$

$$P_m(\{Peter\}) = \frac{0.32}{2} + \frac{0.08}{3} \approx 0.19$$

$$P_m(\{Mary\}) = \frac{0.12}{2} + \frac{0.08}{3} \approx 0.09$$

The picmistic transformation gives a reasonable "Ranking"

# Homepages

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